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ANNIHILATION
I do not want to die--no; I neither want to die nor do
I want to want to die; I want to live for ever and ever
and ever.
Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life

Like Unamuno, many people find it abhorrent to think that well within 90 years they are
going to die and utterly cease to exist. Those who believe that they will never cease to exist
(perhaps because they think of dying as a transition to an afterlife in which they will live forever)
are usually happy about it, and would not willingly forgo the immortality they expect. People who
look upon annihilation as a grim prospect certainly may be well aware that under certain
circumstances it must be regarded as the lesser of the evils among which choice is limited.1 They
realize that it may be the only escape from a spate of creatively cruel torture, for example, and so a
better option than suffering further pain. They may even be willing to say that if their lives were
long enough and their possibilities exhausted, then insufferable boredom would set in.2 And dying
after a short life of (say) 100 years might be better than being forced to live on into a future that
consists of an eternity of empty, indistinguishable days. But to acknowledge that there are worse
fates than annihilation in the near future, is not to deny that it is a terrible fate. Aside from a future
filled with the agonies or boredom of the damned, a worse fate than no future at all is difficult to
imagine. It may be that forever is longer than anyone would voluntarily live; but how many would
refuse the chance to drink a potion that would allow them to live as long as they liked?
Even people who argue that dying is not a bad thing do not really seem to believe what they
are saying.3 More often than not, their anxiety to believe in the innocuousness of their demise
prevents even brilliant thinkers from realizing that their arguments are inane. Epicurus' famous
argument, for example, is about as absurd as any I have seen:
Death is nothing to us. It concerns neither the living nor the dead, since for the former it is not, and
the latter are no more.4
Make no mistake about it: when Epicurus speaks here of death, he means annihilation, and
his claim is that annihilation is nothing to us. The self-deception of people like Epicurus is not
conscious; we cannot relieve our anxiety by swallowing beliefs of whose inanity we are aware. But
deception is nonetheless at work.
Let us assume with Epicurus that death means annihilation. Then can we truthfully say that
death is nothing to us? I think not. Nor should we want to believe that the deaths we will soon face
are nothing to us, I shall argue. Once we see what we would have to be like in order to be truly as
unconcerned about dying as Epicurus professed to be, we will see that we are better off dreading
our dying day. However, I shall suggest that there are steps we can take to ensure that if luck is on
our side, dying will not be as bad a thing for us as it is capable of being. But few are so lucky.
I. The Misfortune of Dying
Why should anyone believe that dying (thought of as annihilation) is a misfortune? One
suggestion begins with the observation that something is a misfortune for us if it thwarts our
desires.5 You would do me an evil if you stole my cherished pet, since thereby you prevent me
from fulfilling my desire to live in peace with my pet. On the other hand, if all I wanted for my pet
was that it lead a reasonably comfortable life, and it was not my wish that it be me who provided
for its comfort, then you would do me no harm if you stole my pet so long as you saw to its wellbeing. In so doing you would not have thwarted my desires.

It seems reasonable to say, then, that whatever prevents me from getting what I want is a
misfortune for me. But if something that thwarts my desires is an evil for me, then dying is an evil
for me (though perhaps the lesser of all the evils that are inevitable in my circumstances), since it
thwarts my desires. Of course, to say that dying thwarts my desires is to understand 'thwarting my
desires' liberally. An event can prevent me from fulfilling my desires not just by frustrating my
attempts to fulfill them, but also by removing my desires. If an event pulls one of my desires out
by the roots, it certainly does prevent me from fulfilling it. It is in this sense that dying thwarts my
desires. It is a misfortune for me for the same reason that being forced to swallow a drug that
washes away my desires (including my desire not to have swallowed the drug) is a misfortune for
me.
We have said that dying is a bad thing for us since it frustrates our desires. However, a
more accurate way to put matters is that dying is bad for us if it thwarts our desires. On the strength
of the premise that what thwarts my desires is a misfortune for me, we cannot conclude that my
dying is a bad thing for me unless I have desires that would be thwarted by my death. A death
which comes when I have exhausted all of my ambitions will be a welcome release from a life
destined to be one of excruciating emptiness.
An objection can even be made to the thesis that a death which frustrates its victim's desires
is an evil. Suppose that at some point in our lives the only goals we do have left would fail to be
rewarding or would even make us miserable if we were to achieve them. We would not judge
something to be an evil for us if the only goals it frustrated or eradicated were ones which would
prove to be unfulfilling or ones which would make us miserable if we were to accomplish them. So
dying at a time that interrupts only our pursuit of such goals should not be regarded as a misfortune
for us. But an important sort of death, it would seem, remains an evil, namely, one that prevents its
victims from fulfilling fulfilling desires. Call such a death a premature one. Even prematurity as
we have defined it is not an infallible sign of a regrettable end; however, it will serve us well
enough.
II. Epicureans
The idea that a premature death is a misfortune for its victim seems rather obvious. I
believe that it has been responsible for most of the anxiety which people (such as I) have felt about
dying; it seems to them very likely that they are going to die prematurely even if they live to be 120
years old, which they will not. Their plans stretch far out into their futures, and they see no reason
why a hundred years from now they would not plan ahead with equal fervor--if it were not for the
realization that they cannot survive the inevitable physical breakdown of their bodies which is soon
to take place.
Those of us who are uncomfortable or even bitter about dying are appalled by the cheerful
indifference of people who are capable of agreeing with Epicurus' absurd claim that "death is
nothing to us." What would people have to be like to really think that their deaths are nothing to
them (assuming that their lack of concern is not simply due to their refusal to dwell upon 'morbid'
subjects)? The answer, as we shall see, is that to the extent that such people are understandable at
all, they are rather coldhearted and passionless. Having said that, I nonetheless want to claim that
they are worth careful study. By emulating a certain sort of 'Epicurean,' as I shall call an individual
who is indifferent to dying, it may be possible for others to acquire a measure of equanimity in the
face of death without adopting the less desirable characteristics of Epicureans. But before I
describe the kind of Epicurean it would behoove us to become, I shall describe others whose ways
we should shun.

Virtually the only thing worse than the prospect of spending eternity in unmitigated agony
is the prospect of spending eternity in even more intense agony. It is obvious that dying would be
better than either fate. But Epicureans could agree only if they were not completely indifferent to
dying. To agree, they must be willing to admit that under some circumstances dying can be the
best of all available alternatives because of the escape it provides. Yet this they cannot do. The
fact that the Epicureans are completely indifferent to dying means that they never under any
circumstances want to die nor want not to die, and that is possible only if under no circumstances
do they prefer dying to anything nor anything to dying. This makes Epicureans considered as
completely indifferent to dying extremely foreign; hence let us try to describe Epicureans whose
indifference is somewhat limited. Our Epicureans are capable of thinking that dying is preferable
to some alternatives, since it allows them to escape from an unbearable mode of life. But they
remain incapable of thinking that there is an alternative than which dying is worse. For them,
dying is no worse than (i.e., it is at least as good as) remaining alive no matter how utopian life
might be. They believe that dying can be a good thing, but they cannot believe that it is ever a bad
thing.
Because Epicureans prefer dying to various possibilities, they must be capable of having
desires whose form can be expressed as follows:
I want the following to be the case:
Were X not the case at given time t, then I would be dead at t.6
Call desires of this form escape desires. They set out conditions under which life is so bad that,
according to the Epicureans, death is preferable. If Epicureans had no desires of this form, they
would be incapable of ranking dying over living no matter what living entailed, even if living
meant torture of the worst sort.
I think that we can make a further assumption about Epicureans, namely, even they must
agree that a premature death as we defined it is a misfortune for its victim. It would be absurd for
them to adopt an attitude of indifference when they face premature death since that would entail
being unconcerned about something that prevents them from fulfilling desires which they very
much wish to fulfill.
Perhaps, however, it is hasty to think that the prospect of a premature death would dismay
the otherwise unflappable Epicureans. Why couldn't they adopt the view that whatever causes us
neither pain nor pleasure is a matter of indifference? This, in fact, was Epicurus' own hedonistic
view:7 something can be bad, he believed, only if it causes us pain; and something can be good
only if it causes us pleasure. On the strength of the hedonistic criterion, Epicureans could claim
that dying is nothing to us even if it does thwart our desires since it causes us neither pain nor
pleasure. They would admit that the disease or aging process which causes us to die may be a bad
thing; these causes of death may bring us experiences whose unpleasantness is formidable. But
dying causes no sensations at all, they would point out. In fact, it brings about an end to all
sensing. We lack even the opportunity to regret the fact that death has thwarted our desires; once
we die, we experience neither pain, pleasure, nor regret for the simple reason that we experience
nothing at all.
But isn't it a tragedy that death deprives us even of the opportunity to experience, to delight,
and to regret?8
Consider the consequences of the hedonistic view. On this view, an event which would
cause me great pain if I were to find out about it is a matter of indifference so long as I in fact never
do. The fact that my spouse and children have fallen for the lies of my enemy and now hate me but
are pretending not to is of no concern to me, according to hedonists, if my ignorance prevents that

event from causing me any grief. Moreover, hedonists would cheerfully consent to being used in
any way we like so long as we promise to precede their treatment with a drug that makes them
enjoy what we do to them, or at least a drug which suppresses any unpleasant experiences that
might otherwise result from the abuses we have planned for them. I will not bother to list sadistic
atrocities which the hedonists can be made to welcome.
At best, hedonistically inclined Epicureans could say that whatever would cause us neither
pain nor pleasure if we were aware of it while not under the influence of powerful psychotropic
drugs (nor the like) is neither good nor bad. But this weakened sort of hedonism is not strong
enough for their purposes. People who found out that their desires were going to be thwarted
would be distressed by their discovery; they could not regard it as a matter of indifference. Nor
could they be indifferent to that which thwarts their desires, and dying is one of the things that
does.9
Epicureans never regard dying as a misfortune. But I have said that they would have to
regard it as a misfortune if dying thwarted desires whose satisfaction would be fulfilling. Hence
Epicureans must not have any fulfilling desires that can be frustrated by death! Death for them can
never be premature or else it would be a bad thing; therefore they must be so constituted that any
time death comes it is mature. Assuming that Epicureans have goals, then either they are
unfulfilling ones, or else they are ones that cannot be thwarted by death. If Epicureans had any
other sort of goal, they could not be unconcerned about premature death.
But what would a desire that cannot be thwarted by death be like? One desire that
obviously is impervious to death is the desire to die. Rather than being thwarted by my death, my
goal to die is achieved through my death. Like the death wish, escape desires are also invulnerable
to death. They are qualified desires for death: they say that if certain conditions are met, we wish
to be dead. But they do not imply that there are any conditions under which we do not want to be
dead. Hence death presents no obstacle to our satisfying them.
Nor does the list of relevant desires end there. Some of our aims are such that our chances
of successfully accomplishing them are not really affected by what we do in the course of our lives
or even by whether or not we are alive. Being alive does not help us achieve these ends; hence they
cannot be thwarted by our deaths. Since the likelihood that such goals will be achieved does not
depend on what we do with our lives, let us call these independent goals. Ones whose chances of
being achieved do depend on our activities we can call dependent goals. My desire that the moon
continue to orbit Earth, for example, is an independent goal; it cannot provide me any grounds for
deploring death since the behavior of Earth and its satellite is unaffected by what I do in the course
of my life.
Goals that were dependent in the earlier part of my life can become independent as time
passes. If at some point I fully accomplish my dependent goal of at least once visiting France, then
thereafter it is independent. No matter what I do thereafter, I cannot make it more nor less likely
than at least once I set foot in France. Even my subsequent death would not reduce my chances of
achieving that end. People whose dependent ends once made them vulnerable to premature death
could therefore become less vulnerable by rendering those ends independent.
There is another, more interesting type of desire that is invulnerable to our deaths. Suppose
that we care about the situation at some future time, but only on the assumption that we will be
alive at that time; if we think that we will be dead, we are indifferent about the situation. Suicidal
depressants, for example, might take this view. They may strongly wish to be dead, and they may
be totally indifferent to anything that may or may not happen once they are dead; yet they still may
have the attitude that if they are to be alive, they should be well fed. They desire something--in this

case being well fed--only on the assumption or condition that they will continue to be alive. It will
be useful to characterize such conditional desires in a more formal way. My conditional desire
concerning some situation X is one that takes the following form:
I want the following to be the case:
Were I alive at t, X would be the case at t.10
Desires that are not in this way contingent on our being alive call unconditional.
Conditional desires are not independent desires. However, both dependent and independent
goals are capable of being conditionalized, i.e., converted into conditional goals. Consider the
dependent desire to be well fed, for example. As the case of the suicidal depressants mentioned a
moment ago shows, it is entirely possible to possess a conditionalized desire to be well fed. My
independent desire that the moon continue to orbit the sun can be conditionalized as well. I need
only decide that what is important to me is the moon's orbit while I live.
III. The Epicurean Attitude Toward Life
As far as I can tell, the catalogue of desires which cannot be thwarted by death is limited to
escape desires, independent desires, and conditional desires. Not one of the types of goal we have
catalogued can be frustrated by death, and any other type of goal would be vulnerable to death.
Epicureans must possess no fulfilling desires except the sort we have catalogued. This is the secret
of their equanimity: since none of their fulfilling desires can be thwarted by death, then Epicureans
never regard death as a misfortune. Since limiting their desires to the catalogued sorts is the only
way Epicureans could ensure that death is no evil for them, however, we shall want to consider
what kind of person they have had to become as a result of that limitation. Only then can we
decide whether it would be a good idea to follow their example.
Consider their motivation to take up the activities in which we normally engage. Since
Epicureans never have any reason to avoid dying, it may appear that they have no reason to do
anything (with the possible exception of committing suicide). But this is an important mistake. It
is true that their independent desires cannot provide Epicureans grounds for any activities since by
definition these are desires about whose fulfillment Epicureans can do nothing of importance.
However, conditional desires do provide strong reason for action. Such desires can enable
Epicureans to take an interest in things for which life is a precondition. While indifferent to the
prospect of dying in their sleep, Epicureans may take the attitude that if they do awake, their
wakeful days should be spent in vigorous pursuit of an exciting career, in raising a family, etc. And
for this to be possible, they will need to seek an education and work long hours in pursuit of a
career.
But wouldn't they necessarily be indifferent to their health? No, since it would be eminently
reasonable for them to want to spend their days--if days they will indeed spend--in the comparative
comfort and convenience of health rather than the discomfort of disease. It is not necessary to want
to avoid dying in order to want to do things that tend to make dying unlikely. The fact that our
goals make our deaths unlikely can be an unintended sideeffect. Even Epicureans who are no
longer living out of inertia but who have developed a positive wish to die may be unable to commit
suicide because of a strong aversion to pain.
Suppose that someone went around injecting Epicureans with painless but deadly poison.
Wouldn't an Epicurean society have to be indifferent about that practice, since it would not interfere
with any Epicurean's desires? No, precisely because it would interfere. It is true that an Epicurean
cannot abhor these murders on the grounds that they are bad for their victims. But the murders
could be abhorred (unless they involve the massacre of entire societies or the entire human race)

because they deprive people of their loved ones. The murders are bad for the survivors, who
wanted to share their lives (if lives they shall lead) with the victims. Even pariahs who have no
strong ties are likely to play a positive role in society somewhere. But if the pariahs play no useful
role whatever, Epicureans could condemn the murder of pariahs only on the grounds that if that sort
of thing were permitted it might lead people to kill those who do have a role to play. Anyone who
is inclined to condemn Epicureans on the grounds that they do not appreciate how bad murder is
should, however, recall that the victims themselves are to their very cores genuinely indifferent to
dying. How bad can it be to do something to someone who is incapable of anything except
absolute indifference about what you plan to do?
So far, adopting the Epicurean approach may not seem terribly unattractive. If something
which is a bad thing for us given our present desires turns out to be inevitable, then why not alter
our desires so that we no longer must regard the inevitable as an evil?11 Dying is inevitable, so why
not disarm it by limiting ourselves to the desires of Epicureans? Unfortunately, the indif-ference to
dying which the Epicurean approach would secure us comes at a price most of us will not be
willing to pay. The attraction of the Epicurean way of looking at things is that they do not care
whether their lives are shorter than usual or longer than usual; death, whenever it comes, is nothing
to them. However, Epicureans think that death is nothing to them only because they think that life
is nothing to them. They are capable of their indifference to death only because they have pared
down their concerns to the point that life is now a matter of indifference to them. For in avoiding
all aspirations that can be thwarted by death, Epicureans have had to avoid all desires which are
capable of giving Epicureans a reason for living. In order to maintain their unconcern about dying,
they must avoid having any reason whatsoever for not dying. However, any reason for living is an
excellent reason for not dying; so only if they avoid having any reason for living can they avoid
having any reason for not dying.
The extent to which Epicureans have sabotaged their moti-vation for living can be brought
out by examining the desires to which they are limited, desires that are invulnerable to death.
Independent goals (unlike dependent ones) are incapable of giving us reason to remain alive and to
avoid dying since our lives and the things we do with our lives play no role toward the achievement of such goals. Conditional desires are similarly impotent; because they apply only on the
assumption that we are alive, they cannot provide grounds for being alive. Like the other desires
Epicureans possess, escape desires (as well as the death wish itself) are incapable of providing any
reason to remain alive; on the contrary, escape desires provide reason to die. Beyond conditional,
independent, and escape desires, the only other desires Epicureans can have are unfulfilling ones,
and these are obviously as impotent as the others with respect to motivating Epicureans to live. Out
of the desires possessed by Epicureans, then, a case for remaining alive cannot be built. Since they
limit their desires to those listed above, and so consider dying at least as good as any other option,
it is useful to characterize the Epicurean personality as death-tolerant.12 By contrast, the
personality of people who have unconditional desires that make living desirable can be called lifeaffirming.
Since Epicureans cannot allow themselves any motivation to live, they must ensure that
they never think that it would be good to live. For to say that living is good certainly implies that it
is preferable to dying, which is a view Epicureans must eschew. On their view, living no sort of
life would be better than dying. A conception of a good or worthwhile life is a description of a life
that would be good to live; such a conception Epicureans completely lack. (What they can have is
a conception of a life such that it is a matter of indifference whether it is lived.) To make sure they
do not develop one, moreover, they must be very selective in their activities. If an activity or set of

activities promises to be so enjoyable that it threatens to make a life spent in pursuit of that activity
good, then those who wish to retain with a death-tolerant personality must abandon it in haste, or at
least take steps that ensure that they do not enjoy what they do so much that they begin to show an
interest in living. They must fill their lives with blander fare.
Nothing said here supports the claims, occasionally made, that life's being meaningful or
worthwhile is due to the fact that we die,13 or that life is meaningless because we die.14 Both
claims imply that it is due to death that life has the value it does, which is not true. A life can be
made neither good nor bad by the fact that it will eventually end, any more than a car can be made
good or bad by the fact that it will eventually be scrapped. A life has the value it does quite
independently of the fact that it will end. In fact, death has the value it does due to the value of the
life it ends. Speaking roughly, dying is a bad thing when living on would be good, and when living
on would be bad, dying is good.
Because Epicureans are not interested in anything that could lead them to regard living as a
good thing, they do not care about anything that they believe will happen after they die, ignoring
what they care about through their independent desires, which (as we have seen) have no
motivational power in the Epicureans' lives anyway. Those with a death-tolerant personality live
out of inertia most of the time, acting only under the influence of their conditional desires unless
life becomes unpleasant enough to opt out of. But the interest which they take in things through the
agency of their conditional desires does not extend beyond what they believe to be the temporal
boundaries of their lives. For given that their entire attitude about whether or not a given state of
affairs X holds at some time t is conditional, then if they believed that they would be dead at t, then
they would be indifferent about whether or not X would hold at t. This makes Epicureans peculiar
people indeed. Out of her conditional desire for their well-being, an Epicurean mother may well be
concerned about whether her children will survive an imminent catastrophe, but only if she
assumes that she too will survive. Her conditional desires leave her completely indifferent to their
welfare if she assumes that she will die. Nor does the peculiar pattern of her concern for her
offspring end here. She may well place herself between a crazed beast and her children since she
does not think that her life will be bearable to her if they die, and so is willing to risk her life in
their defense. Her life means nothing to her in any case. But she is incapable of writing a will or
taking out life insurance out of concern for her children's well-being after she dies, even if she
knows that they will lead a horrible existence if she fails to act. Whether their lives go well or
poorly after she dies is a matter of utter indifference to her.
Still less could Epicureans desire the welfare of future generations. Because their concern
for others is conditional, Epicureans cannot believe that the welfare of future generations matters at
all, though the welfare of their contemporaries may be important to them.
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that Epicureans have a conditional desire to spend their days
working for the benefit of future generations. They could take the attitude that so long as they are
to go on, they shall work for the benefit of posterity. And an Epicurean mother could decide that so
long as she is alive tomorrow, she shall spend it working to ensure that her children flourish after
she dies. However, these attitudes are not to be mistaken for concern about what occurs after the
Epicureans die. Epicureans just do not care what happens then. They are capable only of
indifference about the well-being of posterity, and an Epicurean mother could not care less about
the welfare of her children after she believes she will die. Therefore, even if Epicureans take an
interest in working for the welfare of posterity, they remain indifferent to the welfare of posterity.
It takes peculiar people to desire to spend time ensuring that some state of affairs holds in the future
even though they are indifferent about whether that state of affairs comes to be. As a matter of

psychological fact, it may be impossible. So since Epicureans must sustain their indifference about
the future if they are to remain Epicureans, it may be impossible for them to want to spend time
influencing the future.
It is worth noting that Epicureans will remain unconcerned about what occurs after their
projected dying day if they adopt the hedonist claim that everything which does not actually cause
them pain or pleasure is a matter of indifference. Hedonists of this sort are capable of caring about
the welfare of their children, but only their welfare at times when the hedonist parents believe that
they (the parents) will be alive. For they realize that dead parents can be caused neither pain nor
pleasure by the fate of their children. Earlier I argued that hedonism is too implausible to sustain
the judgment that premature death is no evil. Here we have a fresh reason to steer clear of
hedonism: consistent hedonists exhibit a callousness which renders their view too unsavory to
adopt.
There are still more reasons not to adopt a death-tolerant personality. Quite often,
conditionalizing our desires would mutilate them so much that retaining the conditionalized
versions of them is something we would not want to do or are psychologically unequipped to do.
Consider, for example, the conditionalized form of our altruistic concern for the welfare of others.
It is probably not really possible for us to care intensely about someone's welfare up to the point at
which we believe that we will die, yet be entirely indifferent to their welfare thereafter. Some of us
could probably manage to be relatively unconcerned about anyone else's welfare at any time.
Becoming utterly aloof in this way is probably the only way any of us could become death-tolerant,
however, since none of us has the capacity to care intensely yet within sharply defined temporal
boundaries.
Even the conditionalized form of a purely self-centered desire can be enormously peculiar.
Our self-centered projects play an important role in our lives, and most of them can succeed only if
we survive, either because we are an essential ingredient in them, as I am in my plan to become
President of Money Bank, or my plan to lead a long life of adventure, or else because we play a key
role in them. Hence we must conditionalize our concern for these projects if we are to emulate the
Epicureans. But is a deep concern about such projects really consistent with the attitude that their
failure is a matter of indifference so long as we do not live through their demise? How serious can
I be about wanting to discover the cure for cancer if I am just as happy to fail so long as I do not
live through my failure? The fact is that a conditionalized passion is not a passion, for we can
conditionalize our passions in life only if we no longer take them seriously enough to want to live
another day. Once conditionalized, they can no longer play any significant role in what might have
been a worthwhile life.
IV. Epicureanizing Our Desires
Dying is a constant threat to those of us who are unable or unwilling to abandon our
concern for projects and lives whose welfare depends crucially on us, and so for us death is an evil.
The strategy of the Epicureans, moreover, has proved to be unavailable to those of us who have a
life-affirming personality, since they owe their indifference about longevity to their indifference to
living. At best, life is a burden for those with a death-tolerant personality, something to be made as
free of misery as possible; it is either a bore which they can take or leave, or a curse they would be
better off without. Their view is not quite that nothing is anything to us, but it comes very close.
Instead of succumbing to the despairing attitude that we have nothing to live for, we would be
better off immersing ourselves in projects for which we are capable of living, and resign ourselves
to the fact that we cannot persist in our endeavors for long.

Although we should not emulate the Epicureans we have described, it does seem to me that
there is a type of Epicurean which we should strive to become. Unlike the ones we have discussed
before, the Epicureans I have in mind are anxious to squeeze as much as possible out of life. But
these neo-Epicureans (as I will call them) realize that one can squeeze out of a lifetime only as
much as a lifetime can hold. If people's life expectancy can be increased, they are certainly in favor
of doing so, since more can be squeezed into a longer life. The opportunity to live longer is a bad
thing for no one. An abundance of life might make us less anxious to pack as much as possible into
each moment of our lives, but what would be the harm of living at less frenzied a pace? And of
course, if there are people who cannot find anything to do with their extended lives, suicide is
always an option. But neo-Epicureans realize that they are forced to accept the life expectancy that
is determined by the technology of their era in history. That technology, whether advanced or
primitive, determines what for them is a normal lifetime.15 Neo-Epicureans have impressed upon
themselves the fact that unless further advances in life extension techniques can be expected, they
cannot possibly expect much more than a normal lifetime, and so they cannot allow their happiness
to require more. This they accomplish partly by making an effort to commit themselves only to
projects which can come to fruition within the confines of a normally extended lifetime. They
realize that it is reasonable to live one's life as if on the assumption that one will survive a normal
lifetime, but not to plan life as if on the assumption that one will live beyond. Hence they try to
make sure that their ambitions do not extend beyond a normal lifetime except in the form of
conditional desires as well as escape desires.
But the neo-Epicureans could not limit their goals in this way without abandoning much of
what makes life worthwhile. For example, they would have to forgo bringing children into the
world--or at least avoid developing ties to any children they do produce--since their daughters and
sons cannot be counted on to come to an end just as their Epicurean parents die. (Nor, presumably,
would Epicurean parents want to ensure that their children would die on schedule if seeing to their
demise were possible.) The only further alternative for Epicurean parents, caught in the
predicament of being unable to reproduce for fear that they may become attached to their issue, is
to conditionalize their concern for their children, to adopt the absurd attitude that a child's wellbeing is important while its parent is alive, but entirely a matter of indifference otherwise.
Rather than adopt one of these absurd approaches, the neo-Epicureans do allow themselves
some ventures which will carry over beyond the reach of a normal lifetime. If they set out to raise
children, they are prepared to care about the well-being of their families even when all of their
children grow into adults. Yet as parents they realize that no matter what they (the parents) do in
the course of a normal lifetime, their offspring could come to grief after the parents die. NeoEpicureans, then, are not unconcerned about everything that happens after they die. But because
they are not indifferent, they try to ensure that those of their concerns that their deaths might leave
vulnerable are rendered invulnerable. For example, if they plan to have children, neo-Epicurean
parents will see to it that the young-sters grow into relatively self-sufficient adults, or at least that
the children's well-being does not depends on the survival of their parents beyond a normal
lifetime. Neo-Epicureans know that they cannot expect to survive beyond a normal lifetime, and so
make sure that well before then they have fully equipped their children for life. Of course, neoEpicureans also realize that they could die before they have equipped their children; but that does
not stop them from reproducing, so long as the odds are in favor of their surviving long enough. To
help minimize the possible tragedy of leaving their children parentless, they will resort to devices
such as insurance.

Neo-Epicureans have a similar approach to all of their other concerns which might be left
vulnerable to what occurs after their deaths. They are not indifferent to these matters; instead, and
because of their concern, they see to it that the goals they are concerned about are as invulnerable
to their deaths as can be. All such goals neo-Epicureans convert to independent goals, so that the
success of these projects is not made less likely by their deaths. In short, as their final years
approach, neo-Epicureans make themselves completely dispensable to everything they care about.
Not worried that the concerns of their lifetimes will come to a bad end with their deaths, they do
not regret passing away. They have, we might say, epicureanized their desires. Death which
comes before they have done what they have set out to do they hate with all their hearts since it
comes between them and what they consider dear. But death which comes after they have
accomplished their goals or rendered their goals independent they do not grudge. It will catch the
neo-Epicureans only with independent or conditional desires.
Being dispensable, however, is something that neo-Epicureans carefully postpone to the
very end. Early on in life, they begin taking steps that will ensure that they will be dispensible, but-like a coffin--dispensability is something they want only when they die. For having our lives
deeply intertwined with those of others is part of what makes life worthwhile. What neoEpicureans want is not that their lives should have made no difference to anybody or anything.
What they want is that their deaths should make no difference. To the extent that our being alive
plays no important role in any of the matters we care about (and to the extend that we care about
nothing), to that extent we have no reason to value our lives. It is the fact that we are indispensable
to people and projects we care about that motivates us to live another day; we should undermine
this motivation, therefore, only when we are prepared to die.
The neo-Epicurean approach to life is, I think, an attractive one. It allows those who can
assume that their lifetimes will be normal to remain relatively calm about their future deaths
without becoming aloof from life. But if I am not already an Epicurean, should I become one? Or
should I perhaps be content to admire them from afar? If I already take an interest in projects for
the success of which I would have to live far beyond a normal lifetime, I can become a neoEpicurean only if I give up or modify those undertakings. If I find myself engaged in the pursuit of
such endeavors, can I do what it takes to become a neo-Epicurean even if I want to? Are our
desires sufficiently within our control that we can give certain ones of them up if we wish, perhaps
replacing them with more desirable ones?
Now of course we have some goals that we cannot modify no matter how badly we might
want to. To say that we should modify them is therefore absurd. (I am assuming that we are not
willing to alter our desires using brainwashing or the like. More on that presently.) No one can
give up the desire to avoid pure pain, for example, even masochists. They seek the pleasure which
accompanies an otherwise painful experience. Like the aversion to pain, a fondness for pleasures
such as gastronomic and orgasmic ones is also something we all have by virtue of our very nature;
we are built that way. Nor are all of our involuntary desires visceral. Some of them are
manifestations in our conscious life of underlying needs. It is human nature, for example, to need
the association of other people; that is why solitary confinement is such an effective punishment.
Even if we never form the conscious desire for close ties with others--indeed, even if we think we
prefer a life of complete solitude--we need them all the same; because of our human nature we
would be miserable without them.
But not all desires are so deeply rooted as those which stem from underlying needs. And
these shallower ambitions tend to be more malleable. My desire to acquire a cat, for example, is
easily abandoned. To drop it, it may be sufficient for me to discover that I am violently allergic to

fur. Whether I should change desires that are subject to voluntary manipulation is, therefore, an
open question.
Even desires that are to some extent malleable cannot be changed under just any
circumstances. Changing a desire is not like changing the position of our hands; we can move our
hands at whim, but we cannot desire at whim. But usually we can make substantial changes in our
desires when it is clear to us that it is rational for us to do so. The cat was out as soon as I saw that
owning it meant suffering. In speaking about modifications which we can or cannot make in our
desires, I have been assuming that we do not resort to measures involving brainwashing or the
chemical or surgical manipulation of our brains. However, I see no reason why in principle we
should not make desirable changes in our scheme of desires using hypnosis, chemicals, or other
sorts of artificial methods. In fact, such artificial methods are constantly invoked already. People
who wish to give up smoking are well served by hypnotists who help them conquer their urge for
cigarettes, for example. To countenance artificial methods is not to advocate forced manipulations
of people's desires, or course, any more than to recommending hypnotism to a reluctant smoker is
to kidnap and brainwash a smoker who is happy only with tobacco. The suggestion is just that if
individuals decide that it really would be desirable to epicureanize their aspirations, they may as
well use artificial means of doing so rather than limiting themselves to what they can achieve
through sheer willpower.
In order for us to avoid forming a desire, or to abandon one we have already formed, it is
often sufficient that we come to realize that we cannot possibly fulfill it. But not always.
Moreover, the difficulty we have in abandoning desires we just cannot satisfy is sometimes
overwhelming even when they are not involuntary. The desire for sight is not wired in, unlike the
desire to avoid pain; those who are born blind and always convinced that the condition is
irreversible may never develop any serious desire to see. To do so would cause them needless
suffering and would be irrational. But I strongly doubt that blind people who were able to see for
most of their lives will ever cease to crave sight. They will always deeply resent their sightless
condition. After all, so much of what they value depended on their being able to see, and only if
they can completely overhaul their values can they become reconciled to their fate. Of course, the
rational thing for them to do is to overhaul their desires, but it is nonetheless tragic that they should
have to resort to modification, and the fact that modification is the rational course of action does
not mean they can pursue it, or even that they will want to try.
People who are considering whether or not to become neo-Epicureans are in a position in
many ways analogous to that of the newly blind. The main difference is that whereas the blind are
missing out on something of which most normal human beings are capable, it has never been
possible for any human being to live much more than a normal lifetime. The dying are going
through something no one has ever been able to escape and which no one may ever be able to
escape. In view of the inevitability of death, there can be no question that the rational course is to
give up aspirations that we can accomplish only if we live more than a normal lifetime, but it is still
tragic that we should have to let these hopes go, tragic that we should have to deal with the
misfortune of death by abandoning things we care about. If we nonetheless manage to do so, or
better yet, if we can manage to avoid ever forming aspirations that death is certain to defeat, then
we will be a good deal happier. And it is likely that the task of adjusting our desires will become
considerably easier if we take seriously the fact that in wishing to do what cannot be accomplished
within the confines of a maximally extended lifetime we are trying to attain the impossible. It is
conceivable that research will yield life extension techniques; that would call for a readjustment of

the plans we make for our lives. But to plan our lives on the assumption that such techniques will
be forthcoming would only result in bitter disappointment.
Abandoning desires that cannot be satisfied within the span of a normal lifetime is
something we can accomplish only to the extent that we have not already allowed what is dear to us
depend on the impossible being possible. If we have, we face the task of inventing for ourselves a
new plan of life that can be realized within the more narrow confines of a normal lifetime, a task
that may well prove to be too much for us. It will be those who were reared with the promise of
immortality always before them that will suffer most when they become convinced of their
mortality. A good deal of anguish is in store for them unless they never really took that promise so
seriously as to let anything dear to them depend on immortality.
Many will find the task of epicureanizing their desires difficult. But some parts of that task
are easy to accomplish. Ensuring our own dispensability, for example, is a good deal easier than we
perhaps would like to believe. It is rare indeed that people's lives are shattered irretrievably when
their parents die, especially when their parents have lived a complete lifetime. It is even more rare
that world affairs turn on whether or not particular individuals survive beyond a normal lifetime.
For the most part, people are already dispensable; becoming so takes no effort at all. If we are
indispensable, it is likely to be because we have developed strong ties to a small number of people
in whose lives we play a very important role. It is likely to be because we are united with friends
(including those we love) in mutually rewarding activities and our friends value the fact that it is
we who are taking part in those activities with them.16
Even if we succeed in epicureanizing our desires and living long enough to see our projects
through, we must still face the usual concommitants of dying: pain and physical breakdown.
While it is not accurate to say that dying is a bad thing for us because of the pain and physical
decline that lead up to it, this pain and decline certainly are bad things, and even those of us who
manage to hold our whithering bodies together long enough to achieve what passes as 'old age' can
rarely hope to avoid suffering terribly before we die.
Still, there is an obvious strategy for minimizing the agony that precedes dying. Supposing
that we truly have accomplished our projects on schedule, then instead of waiting for nature to
decide the course of events leading up to our death, we are better off taking our fates into our own
hands. In many cases, painless suicide will be the best course. But planning for ourselves a
painless suicide will require that we make the truly agonizing decision that our ventures are at an
end, and further living would not be worthwhile. Making this decision could be the worst
experience we will ever undergo. But we may not be so lucky. What we would experience if we
did not make it is likely to be worse.
V. Summary
We should not be indifferent about dying, any more that we should be indifferent about
other misfortunes that will befall us. And a misfortune dying assuredly is for those of us whose
endeavors make living a good thing. For dying prevents us from engaging further in those
endeavors which we find so rewarding.
Nor should we want to be indifferent about dying, in view of what we would have to
become in order to be indifferent to death whenever it may come. What we would have to do is to
renounce the many ties, concerns and projects that make us life-affirmers. No longer could we
pursue any fulfilling desire that would be thwarted if we were to die. But it is precisely these goals
whose satisfaction makes life worth living. These are the ones that give us a reason to think that
living is good. Any aspiration capable of motivating us to live is one we can achieve only if we are

alive; inevitably, then, any such hope would be frustrated by our deaths. In the end, then, to
become indifferent to death, to adopt a death-tolerant personality, requires that we give up all
desires that give us reason to live. It requires that we become indifferent to life. But we are better
off thinking that dying is bad than thinking that living cannot be good.
If we are doomed to undergo the misfortune of dying, we can at least make our destiny as
tolerable as possible. We can allow ourselves to live life passionately, but according to a plan
whereby everything we propose to do can be accomplished within the span of a normal lifetime.
Concerns which transcend those limits we should occasionally allow ourselves as well, but only if
we plan to render them invulnerable to our deaths. If we succeed in molding the scheme of our
desires in this way, and if we die only after accomplishing what we have set out to do, then for us
dying will not be such a bad thing. Whether we can say that it will not be a bad thing at all depends
on what we think we could do with more time than is granted us.
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And I must confess, painful though the confession be, that in the days of the simple faith of my
childhood, descriptions of the tortures of hell, however terrible, never made me tremble, for I
always felt that nothingness was much more terrifying. ...It is better to live in pain that to cease to
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